We investigate efficient fee structures for actively managed funds when both the investor-principal and the prospective manager-agent have utility functions of the generalized log variety. Efficient fees include a fixed component that reflects the manager's protected consumption. This is a new rationale for a flat component of fees analogous to fee-for-service. Also new is our result that participation is not all or nothing. Specifically, the amount placed with the active manager is equal to the investor's wealth less the present value of the total protected consumption of the investor and the manager. Efficient fees also include variable components reflecting total assets under management and performance relative to a passive benchmark.
Introduction
Most mutual funds are actively managed. This gives rise to an adverse-selection problem as investors cannot easily assess manager skills or diligence. Managers may also be susceptible to moral hazard arising from insufficient effort on behalf of the client. We investigate fee structures that mitigate agency problems when both the principal and the agent have utility functions of the generalized log variety. One new result is that efficient fees include a fixed component reflecting the agent's protected consumption. This represents a new rationale for a flat component of fees analogous to fee-for-service. This fixed component could take the form of a proportional asset fee in conjunction with some minimum investible amount stipulated in the manager's prospectus, as we commonly observe. Another new result is that from both an investor and manager standpoint the participation decision is not all-or-nothing.
Specifically, the amount placed with the active manager is equal to the investor's wealth less the present value of the total protected consumption of the investor and the manager.
Remaining wealth is allocated to safe assets.
Notwithstanding these new results our formal analytical structure holds few surprises for readers of Dybvig et al (2010) . Accordingly, our efficient fee structure retains variable components reflecting assets under management and performance relative to a passive benchmark, as highlighted by those authors. They derive optimal contracts under the assumption that both the investor-principal and the manager-agent have log utility. Efficient fees are typically proportional to assets under management. When agency problems are present, fees include a component of remuneration proportional to actual performance less a passive benchmark return. Benchmarking serves to mitigate the problem of closet indexing.
The participation decision in their analysis is all-or-nothing in the sense that either no wealth or the entire wealth of the investor is placed with the active manager, in contrast to the participation decision here.
Generalized log utility viewed as a model was abbreviated to GLUM by Rubinstein (1976) , who described it as the premier one-parameter utility function for financial models of households. In contrast to its quadratic, log and exponential competitors, generalized log utility has the realistic implication that relative risk aversion falls as wealth rises. For example, we typically see a greater proportionate investment in stocks as wealth rises.
Generalized log utility turns out to be the simplest and most appealing of the three special cases of Hyperbolic Absolute Risk Aversion (HARA) that were investigated numerically by Bateman et al. (2007) in the context of retirement planning. It is the simplest way to capture habit-dependent utility whereby a retiree is concerned to prevent her living standard falling below some pre-determined level. To the extent the habit paradigm makes sense at any stage of life, retirement is that stage. Equally, generalized log utility is consistent with a desire to 'keep up with the Joneses'. It can rationalise conservative asset allocations on the cusp of retirement, in contrast to simple log utility, which generates aggressive allocations, corresponding to the familiar 'growth-optimal' property of log utility. Finally, generalized log utility captures the concern of some investors with preventing shortfalls in wealth below some subjective reference level. In particular, the present value of protected consumption is the natural interpretation of that level.
The model
This section generalizes the model of Dybvig et al (2010) . Their three optimization problems impose successively tighter constraints on the objective function, corresponding to increasingly severe agency problems. In the first-best case the manager's choice of action and portfolio can be dictated. Agency problems are absent. In the second-best case the manager reveals truthfully the observed signal but has private information about her effort level. In the third-best case the adverse selection problem and the moral hazard problem are both present. First-best Choose the utility of the investor, ( , ) ( ( , ) )
, and the manager's effort level ε to maximise the investor's expected utility,
subject to the budget constraint
and a participation constraint on the manager,
Here ( 
Third-best Instead of the constraint (4) (or (5)) add a constraint for simultaneous incentivecompatibility of effort and truthful signal reporting:
The utility function of the investor can be rewritten as log( ) problems by the investor's indirect utility. We need a slight extension of it to the case of protected consumptions. In particular, and in the solution of all three forms of the investor's problem, the expected utility conditional on s for the investor turns out to be
where
is the investor's share of the budge net of the present value of total protected consumption.
1 The interpretation of terms like i C has been familiar since Rubinstein (1976) 
)
The proof of (7) Substitute this into equation (9) to get (7).
For future reference and again following Dybvig et al., we set out three definitions of equilibrium returns. The gross portfolio return conditional on observing is s ( )
The gross portfolio return without observing is termed the benchmark return and is given by s ( )
Finally, the return under maximum effort ( 1)
These definitions give the intuitive decomposition
(1 ) .
Equation (7) enables computation of the investor's expected utility, namely
Following Dybvig et al. the second term in this expression can be written as ( ) K ε as a reminder of its independence from the two utility functions.
Optimal contracts
First-best In this case we differentiate the Langrangean associated with the problem of maximising (13) 
)
where R λ is the Lagrange multiplier on (4). Multiply both sides by ( ) 
Equations (14) and (16) together imply
so the manager's fee is net of the present value of total protected consumption C . In this way the optimal contract protects core interests of the investor and manager alike.
Second-best
In this case the investor does not necessarily observe the manager's effort so we replace equation (4) Proposition 1 (pace Dybvig et al.) The second-best contract gives the manager a payoff that consists of a fixed component plus a component proportional to the investor's payoff plus a bonus that is proportional to the excess return of the portfolio over a benchmark:
( )
where m B and are non-negative constants. k
Proof. The second-best contract follows from maximizing (13) 
where ε λ is the Lagrange multiplier to (19). Paralleling the derivation of (17) and (18) we get
Taking exponentials of both sides shows that the manager's fee includes one fixed and two proportional components. The first proportional component is an asset fee and the second is a bonus or penalty depending on whether the active manager performs better or worse than a passive (zero-effort) benchmark:
where 0.
Equation (22) helps explain the fact that we seldom see 'symmetric' or 'fulcrum' elements in contracts to the extent that the incentive fee introduces states in which the investor receives a payment from the manager. 
The third-best contract follows from maximizing (13) with respect to ω and subject to 
where is the Lagrange multiplier on (24).
As in Dybvig et al. the manager's share of the budget (here net of the present value of total protected consumption) is no longer constant but depends on the signal. Specifically,
so that
Numerical analysis
This section gives a numerical analysis of optimal contracts. For brevity we confine attention To the extent signal and market are both high, moving to a higher level of protected consumption leads to less difference in the fee. The intuition is straightforward; protected consumption has less effect on outcomes to the extent returns are both forecastable and high. To compare the manager's fee in first-best and second-best we examine changes in the manager's fee as we move from first-best to second-best; Figure 4 shows the fee in secondbest minus first-best. The manager is rewarded when signal and market are both high and is therefore induced to exert effort.
However, following an increase in the manger's protected consumption the manager is less rewarded when signal and market are high, as shown in Figure 5 . This indicates that higher protected consumption leads to less effort. 
Conclusion
We extended the influential model of fees due to Dybvig et al. to the case of generalized log utility. This extension is inconsequential from a mathematical standpoint but is significant for answering the questions of whether fees should contain a flat component and the extent to which an investor should entrust her entire wealth to a single active manager.
